A better grading system and double standards around occupational licensing

A better grading system

Professor Merritt argues that mandatory grading curves can be unfair when one class has stronger students than another.  I agree. 

Statistician Valen Johnson—whom I cite in my last post as an authority on grade inflation— has developed a clever solution to this problem which involves adjusting grading curves within each class based on the ability levels of the students.  A Johnson-inspired proposal was nearly adopted at Duke University in the late 1990s, but was blocked by departments that offered higher grades and attracted weaker students.

Most law schools try to balance their sections in term of student ability levels and overall quality of faculty.  Nevertheless, anomalies like a “smart section” (as Professor Merritt calls it) may occasionally occur.  Johnson’s proposal would be an excellent solution to this problem.

Occupational licensing

Professor Merritt asserts that there is some sort of problem with the market for lawyers and law graduates that makes competition and inequality uniquely bad in the context of law.  These assertions are implausible given the low barriers to entry for both law schools and lawyers, aggressive competition between law schools for students and between lawyers for clients, and widespread inequality outside of law school and legal practice.  Some form of regulation is the norm in many areas of employment and in many industries, and a licensing regime for lawyers and an accreditation system for law schools do not in any way make these occupations and institutions unique or unusual.  According to a recent study, nearly a third of U.S. workers are licensed, licensing is more common as education and skill levels increase, and licensing does not affect inequality among the licensed. 

As a general matter, deregulated market competition and greater inequality are a package deal.  Inequality can be reduced through regulation, taxation, and politicization of compensation through unionization or growth of public sector employment.

Professor Merritt’s critiques follow the standard playbook of law school critics—take something about law schools that is widespread and common out of context, claim that it is somehow unique to law schools when it is neither unique nor unusual, and then demonize it.

UPDATE:

Jeremy Telman responds.