Greenberg, Leiter, Quine, Realism, Naturalized Jurisprudence

Via Solum, I see that Mark Greenberg (UCLA--but whom we're fortunate to have at Texas this calendar year as a Harrington Fellow and Visiting Assistant Professor in the Law School) has put on-line a revised version of the very fine paper on my work that he gave at a conference at Columbia six years ago.  In my just released book Naturalizing Jurisprudence, there is actually an extended discussion of Greenberg's critique at pp. 112-117, where I note that Greenberg's "cleverly framed objection [is] the most intriquing one registered against my account over the last decade," but then argue that "it gets both Quine, and my own use of Quine, wrong in subtle ways" (p. 113).  The issues here are somewhat tricky and technical, but philosophically-minded readers interested in Quine and in my arguments for naturalized jurisprudence will surely profit from Greenberg's paper and should also take a look at my discussion of his arguments in the book.