Brian Leiter's Law School Reports

Brian Leiter
University of Chicago Law School

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Friday, September 7, 2012

More citation studies

This time from James Phillips, a PhD student at Berkeley's JSP program, and John Yoo (Berkeley). 

The two most interesting things they do are consult citations in the "Web of Science" database (to pick up citations for interdisciplinary scholars--this database includes social science and humanities journals) and calculate a citations-per-year score for individual faculty.  A couple of caveats:  (1) they look at only the top 16 schools according to the U.S. News reputation data, so not all law schools, and not even a few dozen law schools; and (2) they make some contentious--bordering in some cases on absurd--choices about what "area" to count a faculty member for.  (This is a dilemma, of course, for those who work in multiple areas, but my solution in the past was to try to gauge whether three-quarters of the citations to the faculty member's work were in the primary area in question, and then to also include a list of highly cited scholars who did not work exclusively in that area.)  Many of those decisions affect the ranking of schools by "area."  The limitation to the top 16 schools by reputation in U.S. News also would affect almost all these lists.  See also the comments here.

I liked their discussion of "all stars" versus "super stars," but it was a clear error to treat the top fifty faculty by citations per year as "super stars"--some are, most aren't.  Citations measures are skewed, first off, to certain areas, like constitutional law.  More importantly, "super stars" should be easily appointable at any top law school, and maybe a third of the folks on the top fifty list are.  Some aren't appointable at any peer school.  And the citations per year measure has the bizarre consequences that, e.g., a Business School professor at Duke comes in at #7 (Wesley Cohen, whom I suspect most law professors have never heard of), and very junior faculty who have co-authored with actual "super stars" show up in the top 50.

I was also puzzled by why the authors thought "explaining" the U.S. News peer reputation scores was relevant--the closer a measure correlates with that, the more dubious it would seem to be, I would have thought.  But that's minor. 

Appendix 5, publications per year, was utterly mysterious to me as to how the results were arrived at!

That's enough commentary for now--there's lots of interesting data here, and perhaps this will inspire others to undertake additional work in this vein. 

UPDATE:  A couple of readers asked whether I thought, per the title of the Phillips & Yoo piece, that their citation study method was "better."  I guess I think it's neither better nor worse, just different, but having different metrics is good, as long as they're basically sensible, and this one certainly is.  On the plus side, it's interesting to see how adding the Web of Science database affects things, and also how citations per year affects results.  On the negative side, a lot of "impact" that will be picked up in the Web of Science database may be of dubious relevance to the impact on law and legal scholarship.  And the citations-per-year measure has the odd result of elevating very junior faculty with just a year or two in teaching into elevated positions just because they may have co-authored a piece with a senior scholar which then got a few dozen citations.   No metric is perfect (what would that even mean?), but this one certainly adds interesting information to the mix.   It's particularly notable how the results are basically the same at the high end (Yale, Harvard, Chicago, Stanford, Columbia, NYU), but with some interesting movements up and down thereafter.

Of course, the biggest drawback of their approach is not the approach itself but that they only examined 16 law schools.  But someone else could rectify that.

September 7, 2012 in Rankings | Permalink

Thursday, September 6, 2012

Health law

The blog.

September 6, 2012 in Of Academic Interest | Permalink

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

Tax scholarship matters...

Tuesday, September 4, 2012

Chicago Alumni (plus Bigelows and other Fellows) on the Teaching Market, 2012-13


This post is strictly for schools doing hiring this year; it concerns our alumni and our Bigelow and other Fellows on the teaching market.  I am Chair of the Placement Committee at the Law School, and happy to supply more information, including confidential evaluations, on any of these candidates.  You can reach me at or at 773-702-0953.  You may also contact the recommenders listed below directly, of course, but I've talked to all the Chicago ones and may be able to save you some time (or point you to the recommenders who would be most helpful given your school's needs/interests).

Here are profiles of the alumni candidates who presently have recommenders at Chicago and with whom we have worked, and so about whom we have the most information.  (We have had to omit one very strong candidate working in international business transactions and international antitrust, among other areas, because her employer does not know she is on the market.  Feel free to contact me for more information.)  All these candidates have submitted materials to the FAR:

Continue reading

September 4, 2012 in Faculty News | Permalink

Remember that "Faculty Lounge" posts...

Monday, September 3, 2012

Attention Hiring Committees: Don't Google Candidates

Friday, August 31, 2012

The world according to "scam" bloggers

A reader (who asked not to be identified, lest he be pilloried by the sociopaths of cyberspace) sent me this very funny comment from another blog, that had apparently dared to discuss legal education without self-flagellation, and so was linked by a "scamblog" and then invaded by its handful of 'readers':

Prof. McCormick, I should warn you that you've been linked by the Campos "scam" blog, so its five regular commenters are now descending on you. These are people who believe that (1) law professors are Nazis, (2) no one should go to law school unless it's Harvard or Yale or free, (3) law professors are Nazis, (4) only people who have practiced for twenty years are qualified to teach, (5) law professors are Nazis, and (6) Paul Campos is a courageous man.

 And that about sums up 'thinking' in the bowels of cyberspace! 

August 31, 2012 in Law in Cyberspace, Of Academic Interest | Permalink

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

Judge Posner on Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence

This is a review that would finish the career of the academic who authored the book in question, and might even raise questions about scholarly fraud.  Fortunately, Justices really do have "life" tenure!  An excerpt:

OMITTING CONTRARY evidence turns out to be Scalia and Garner’s favorite rhetorical device. Repeatedly they cite cases (both state and federal) as exemplars either of textual originalism or of a disreputable rejection of it, while ignoring critical passages that show the judges neither ignoring text nor tethered to textual originalism. Thus they applaud White City Shopping Center, LP v. PR Restaurants, LLC, a decision that held that the word “sandwiches” in a lease did not include burritos, tacos, or quesadillas, because Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “sandwich” as “two thin pieces of bread, usually buttered, with a thin layer (as of meat, cheese, or savory mixture) spread between them.” Scalia and Garner stop there, as if that dictionary reference were the court’s entire decision, thus confirming the use of the dictionary as a guide to the meaning of legal documents. But the court had not stopped with the dictionary.

A company called PR had leased space to operate a sandwich shop in a shopping center. Its lease forbade the shopping center to lease space to another store if more than ten percent of the new store’s sales would be of sandwiches. PR claimed that the shopping center violated the lease when it leased space to a Mexican-style restaurant that planned to sell burritos, tacos, and quesadillas. After noting Merriam-Webster’s definition of sandwich, the court made a series of points in support of its decision against PR that were unrelated to dictionary definitions: “PR has not proffered any evidence that the parties intended the term ‘sandwiches’ to include burritos, tacos, and quesadillas. As the drafter of the exclusivity clause, PR did not include a definition of ‘sandwiches’ in the lease nor communicate clearly to White City during lease negotiations that it intended to treat burritos, tacos, quesadillas, and sandwiches the same. [PR] was aware that Mexican-style restaurants near the Shopping Center existed which sold burritos, tacos, and quesadillas prior to the execution of the Lease yet, PR made no attempt to define, discuss, and clarify the parties’ understanding of the term ‘sandwiches.’”

Those are more persuasive points than the dictionary’s definition, and as is often the case, the court got the definition wrong. (Scalia and Garner miss this, too.) A sandwich does not have to have two slices of bread; it can have more than two (a club sandwich) and it can have just one (an open-faced sandwich). The slices of bread do not have to be thin, and the layer between them does not have to be thin either. The slices do not have to be slices of bread: a hamburger is regarded as a sandwich, and also a hot dog—and some people regard tacos and burritos as sandwiches, and a quesadilla is even more sandwich-like. Dictionaries are mazes in which judges are soon lost. A dictionary-centered textualism is hopeless.

Yet in further obeisance to the dictionary Scalia and Garner commend a court for having ordered the acquittal of a person who had fired a gun inside a building and been charged with the crime of shooting “from any location into any occupied structure.” They say that the court correctly decided the case (Commonwealth v. McCoy) on the basis of the dictionary definition of “into.” They misread the court’s opinion. The opinion calls the entire expression “from any location into any occupied structure” ambiguous: while “into” implies that the shooter was outside, “from any location” implies that he could be anywhere, and therefore inside. The court went on to decide the case on other grounds.

Scalia and Garner ridicule a decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas (State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne)that held that cockfighting did not violate the state’s law against cruelty to animals. They say that the court, in defiance of the dictionary, “perversely held that roosters are not ‘animals.’” When I read this, I found it hard to believe that a court would hold that roosters are not animals, so I looked up the case. I discovered that the court had not held that roosters are not animals. It was then that I started reading the other cases cited by Scalia and Garner.

In fact, the court said that “biologically speaking a fowl is an animal,” but that it was not in the class of animals protected by the statute. The court gave a number of reasons for this conclusion—all ignored by Scalia and Garner. One, which was in fact textual originalist, was that “persons of common intelligence” conceived of chickens as birds in contradistinction to animals. But the most cogent reason for the court’s result was that the legislature had passed a statute forbidding cockfighting on Sundays, which implied that it was permissible the rest of the week, and had later repealed the statute, implying that cockfighting was again permissible on any day of the week—and in fact cockfighting was an open and notorious sport in Kansas (to the surprise and disgust of the judges).

Scalia and Garner denounce a court that held, in a case called Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., that the word “family” in a New York rent-control statute that prohibited a landlord from dispossessing a “member of the deceased tenant’s family who has been living with the tenant” included “a cohabiting nonrelative who had an emotional commitment to the deceased tenant.” The word “family” was undefined in the statute. The case may be right or wrong; what is disturbing is Scalia and Garner’s failure to mention that it was a homosexual couple at a time when homosexual marriage was not recognized in New York, and that the opinion states that the two men had been living together just like spouses and had been accepted as such by their families.

Scalia and Garner applaud a decision (State by Cooper v. French) holding that a refusal to rent a house to an unmarried heterosexual couple did not violate a statute forbidding discrimination in rentals on grounds of “marital status,” a term not defined in the statute. The court relied for this conclusion on another statute, one forbidding fornication. One may doubt whether that statute was the actual motivator of the decision, given the statement in the majority opinion—remarkable for 1990—that “it is simply astonishing to me that the argument is made that the legislature intended to protect fornication and promote a lifestyle which corrodes the institutions which have sustained our civilization, namely, marriage and family life.” This statement is not quoted by Scalia and Garner. (And two sentences later the judge referred, contrary to a Scalia-Garner Diktat, to the statute’s legislative history.)

After the refusal to rent, but before the court’s decision, the anti-discrimination law had been amended to define “marital status” as “whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced, separated, or a surviving spouse”; and the man and woman who had wanted to rent were both single, a protected marital status under the amended statute. On the page following their discussion of the case, Scalia and Garner, having moved on to another case, remark that “the meaning of an ambiguous provision may change in light of a subsequent enactment … unless the ambiguous provision had already been given an authoritative judicial interpretation.” The original provision— “marital status”—had been undefined and therefore ambiguous, and had not been given an authoritative judicial interpretation. So the amendment, which broadened statutory protection to unmarried persons, provided some basis (though far from conclusive), consistent with textual originalism as understood by Scalia and Garner, for the court’s decision that they denounce. They do not mention this possibility.

UPDATE:  Bryan Garner, Justice Scalia's co-author, replies (in part) here.

August 29, 2012 in Jurisprudence, Of Academic Interest | Permalink

"Law porn" and U.S. News Rankings

Here's an interesting piece by Larry Cunningham at St. John's, though as Al Brophy (UNC) notes, the period examined is probably too small to draw meaningful conclusions.  NYU's embarrassingly over-the-top alumni magazines (the ones that inspired the term "law porn") in the 1990s actually coincided with a decline in NYU's reputation scores in U.S. News, a cautionary lesson for all!

August 29, 2012 in Rankings | Permalink

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Exploding Offers--What are the Norms?

These devices are becoming more common is my impression.  Some schools have actually made them prior to the 'meat market,' and others make them afterwards.  In the typical case, the candidate is given two weeks, or some even shorter period of time, to accept or decline.  My impressions are that, as a strategy, these do not work well--candidates tend to decline them, or, if they accept, they accept with a plan to head out the door ASAP.  I'm curious what experiences others have had with these offers?

But that's not the main topic I wanted to address.  The main question is should schools utilize exploding offers at all and if so with what time frame?  My own view is that it is in the interest of both the hiring schools and the candidates to provide a 30-day window for any offer, and that anything much less than that is certainly unfair to the candidate, but will also backfire for the hiring school.

What do readers think?  Signed comments only:  full name and valid e-mail address.

UPDATE:  The AALS has officially endorsed a four-week standard.

August 28, 2012 in Advice for Academic Job Seekers, Professional Advice | Permalink | Comments (5)