Brian Leiter's Law School Reports

Brian Leiter
University of Chicago Law School

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Wednesday, May 7, 2014

"Future of Law School Innovation"

A recent conference at the University of Colorado School of Law organized by Dean Phil Weiser, video of which is on-line for viewing.  An interesting line-up of speakers, though I haven't had a chance to view all the proceedings.  (It is striking, of course, which self-serving charlatan, nominally on the Colorado faculty, was missing from the program, and for obvious reasons.)


May 7, 2014 | Permalink

Tuesday, May 6, 2014

Rookie hiring 2013-14

Sarah Lawsky (UC Irvine) has recorded 73 junior hires this year, though as she notes in the comments, there appear to be just 64 tenure-track academic hires (as distinct from tenure-track clinical and/or legal writing positions--those markets generally operate rather differently, which is why it's useful to disagreggate them).  The AALS, in its infinite unwisdom, made it impossible to search job candidates this year by JD school, meaning that, unlike last year, we have no idea how many graduates from each school were actually on the market.  5 of our 7 graduates secured tenure-track positions, and one is still in the running for a 6th.  All would have placed just two or three years ago, but this year saw multiple positions for which schools interviewed disappear (sometimes after callbacks) due to budgetary concerns.  My guess is we will see only 60 or 70 academic tenure-stream lines filled next year as well.  Once the applicant pool stabilizes (my guess is it will next year), schools will go back into the hiring market for new law teachers more aggressively, since many schools are currently leaving lines unfilled for which they have needs.  Even so, I suspect a "recovery" in the teaching market will mean 100-120 new lines being filled, and that is probably 3-5 years off.


May 6, 2014 in Advice for Academic Job Seekers, Faculty News | Permalink

Monday, May 5, 2014

NYU's Sujit Choudry to be Berkeley's new Dean

The Berkeley announcement here.


May 5, 2014 in Faculty News | Permalink

In Memoriam: Gary Becker (1930-2014)

The distinguished economist had a profound impact as well on legal scholarship, including the work of many of my colleagues (he also, in recent years, held an appointment in the Law School).  The Chicago memorial notice is here.


May 5, 2014 in Memorial Notices | Permalink

Friday, May 2, 2014

Post-tenure review coming to Suffolk University

One account here, though it starts on the wrong note:

Suffolk University, taking aim at academia’s hallowed practice of providing lifelong job protection for veteran instructors, has decided to require all its tenured faculty to undergo performance reviews that in some cases could lead to dismissal.

De facto, tenure has often turned out to mean "lifelong job protection," but legally, it means termination only for cause, a standard which imposes procedural requirements and burdens on the employer before termination.  There are aspects of the Suffolk proposal that look problematic (review of faculty by administrators, rather than other faculty, for example), but the basic idea of a periodic performance review is wholly consistent with a "for cause" employment contract.


May 2, 2014 in Of Academic Interest | Permalink

Thursday, May 1, 2014

Texas A&M Law School (formerly Texas Wesleyan) names L&E scholar Andrew Morriss as new Dean

Press release here.  That's a major hiring coup, which surely would not have been possible without Texas A&M taking over Texas Wesleyan.  Morriss, most recently, held a Chair at the University of Alabama, and before that was at the University of Illinois.


May 1, 2014 in Faculty News, Of Academic Interest | Permalink

ATL's approach to ranking law schools: decide what the result should be, then adjust the criteria accordingly

I wish I were making this up, but here it is:

“The top 15 or so are roughly the same schools as you would find in U.S. News and elsewhere,” explains Brian Dalton, research director for Above the Law. “Yale, Harvard and Stanford are the top three as they would be under any credible ranking scheme…"

Note that when U.S. News.com surveyed lawyers and judges last fall (with a 32% respones rate, an all-time high for these surveys), here were "the top three":

1.  Harvard University (4.8)

1.  Stanford University (4.8)

3.  Columbia University (4.7)

3.  University of Chicago (4.7)

3.  Yale University (4.7)

But, heck, what do lawyers and judges know.

And here are the "top three" schools based on scholarly impact in the study by Greg Sisk (St. Thomas) and colleagues in 2012:

1.  Yale University

2.  Harvard University

3.  University of Chicago

And the "top three" according to The National Law Journal based on big firm placement:

1.  Columbia University

2.  University of Chicago

3.  New York University

 And the "top three" in the business law areas:

1.  Harvard University

2.  Columbia University

3.  New York University

But, of course, any "credible" ranking must replicate U.S. News.com....

If they really aren't about to go under, they surely deserve to if this is really their approach.


May 1, 2014 in Of Academic Interest, Rankings | Permalink

Wednesday, April 30, 2014

"Legal Realisms, Old and New"

This was the 2012 Seegers Lecture in Jurisprudence at Valparaiso, now on-line courtesy of their Law Review.


April 30, 2014 in Jurisprudence | Permalink

I don't get to agree with Justice Alito that often...

...but I can happily agree with this observation (from this profile):

The U.S. News and World Report rankings of law schools are an abomination. The legal profession and the country would be better off if they were eliminated. I gather that all these rankings are one of these things that keeps U.S. News and World Report in the black—unlike Newsweek.

(Thanks to Ronald Collins for the pointer.)


April 30, 2014 in Of Academic Interest, Rankings | Permalink

Monday, April 28, 2014

On the "social goods" allegedly promoted by religion

Prof. Mark Movsesian (St. John's) tries to respond to the "religion is not special" view (that I, Eisgruber & Sager, and Schwartzmann, among others, defend) in this blog posting.  Here is the crux of his claim:

Religion, especially communal religion, provides important benefits for everyone in the liberal state—even the non-religious. Religion encourages people to associate with and feel responsible for others, to engage with them in common endeavors. Religion promotes altruism and neighborliness, and mitigates social isolation. Religion counteracts the tendencies to apathy and self-centeredness that liberalism seems inevitably to create.

As I argue in Why Tolerate Religion?, it is certainly true that in the Western capitalist societies, religion is one of the most common sources of resistance to the market pressure towards "self-centeredness," but qua generalization, Movesian's claim is obviously false:  religion encourages the communal sentiments Movesesian describes, but mostly intra-religious group; there is no evidence, and Movesian cites none, that it encourages them generally outside the religious group.  This, of course, is why religion remains, as it has been for millenia, one of the great catalysts of inter-group violence and hatred.  

In lieu of actual evidence, Movsesian writes:

Tocqueville saw this in the nineteenth century. Egalitarian democracy, he wrote, encourages a kind of “individualism.” It trains each citizen to look out for himself according to his own best judgment and discount the needs of the wider society. Self-reliance is a good thing; at least Americans have long though so. But the attitude poses two great dangers for liberal society. First, it makes it difficult to motivate people to contribute to the common projects on which society depends: public safety, schools, hospitals, and the like. Second, it makes it easier for despotism to arise. The despotic state desires nothing more than for individual citizens to feel isolated from and indifferent to the concerns of others, so that the state can easily divide and dominate them all.

Tocqueville saw that voluntary associations could lessen these dangers. Religious associations are particularly useful in this regard. They are uniquely good at promoting social engagement—secular as well as religious. According to sociologist Robert Putnam, for example, regular churchgoers are more likely to vote, serve on juries, participate in community activities, talk to neighbors, and give to charities, including non-religious charities. And when it comes to defying state oppression, no groups are more effective than religious associations, which can inspire members to truly heroic acts of resistance, as dictators down the centuries have learned.

Tocqueville was a shrewd observer, but his observations do not constitute real evidence that religion qua religion produces social goods.  Indeed, Tocqueveille's primary claim was about voluntary associations, of which religion was one example--in the 19th-century a very important one, but less so now.  Again, as I discuss in Why Tolerate Religion?, there is no question that religious believers were among the resolute opponents of Nazi despotism (though other religious believers were also among the supporters); but communists were equally resolute in their opposition to Nazism (though less keen on charity, admittedly, since charity is one of the ways that capitalist societies legitimate an economic system that discards a portion of the population). In terms of motivating opposition to "state oppression," communists not in power have a much stronger record (against Hitler, against apartheid South Africa, against Franco's fascists) than any religious denomination.  (Communists in power have the same awful record as all "true believers," including religious ones, in rationalizing oppression.)  I don't think this means there shoudl be a "free exercise of communism" clause in the Constitution, but that is where a Movesesian-style argument would point, if taken seriously.

I have no doubt that categorical commitment to certain moral ideals is a good thing to cultivate in a population; but there is no evidence--literally none--that religion is uniquely good at doing that and doing it well (Movsesian cites none, obviously).  The peculiarity of religion--with its curious conjunction of categorical commands and insulation from ordinary standards of evidence--has always been that it can motivate people to do things that no one else would typically do.  Sometimes that is very good, and sometimes it is very bad.  In Why Tolerate Religion?, I assume that the protection of conscience is a good--in this regard, I am a mundane liberal--and some readers have criticized me on this score.  But that conscience is a good falls far short of thinking that religious conscience--whose history is far more mixed than Movsesian's quick gloss allows--is a good.  But that's what would need to be established for those who want to defend the inequality at the core of our current First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States.

UPDATE:  Professor Movesesian thinks the material he cited from Robert Putnam is evidence that religion uniquely produces social goods that benefit those outside the religious group.  It does not seem to me it is, and the passge he cites does not show that it is.  Many of the activities in question are also not, or not necessarily, "social goods":  e.g., voting (it depends how one votes obviously) or participating in voluntary associations (those may be good for the participants, but they may not be good for society as a whole).

ANOTHER:  Philosopher Craig Duncan (Ithaca College) calls to my attention to his interesting essay on "Religion and secular Utlitiy:  Happiness, Truth and Pragmatic Arguments for Theistic Belief," Philosophy Compass 8/4 (2013): 381–399 (on-line at Wiley-Blackwell).  In that essay he discussed Norenzayan, Ara and Azim F. Shariff. ‘The Origin and Evolution of Religious Prosociality.’ Science 322.3 (2008):  58–62:

An oft-noted datum, for instance, is the correlation between religious belief and greater charitable giving. Yet even here the picture is complicated, since some recent research suggests that much of the increase in charitable giving is due primarily to a concern to maintain a favorable reputation among one’s religious peers. In a recent and wide-ranging meta-analysis published in Science, for instance, Ara Norenzayan and Azim F. Sharif sum up their findings as follows: ‘‘The preponderance of evidence points to religious prosociality being a bounded phenomenon. Religion’s association with prosociality is most evident when the situation calls for maintaining a favorable social reputation within the ingroup’’ (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, p. 62). Moreover, the authors go on to note that ‘‘the ‘dark-side’ of within group cooperation is between-group competition and conflict’’ (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, p. 62) – presumably, they have religious intolerance in mind – and they also note that ‘‘there are many examples of modern, large, cooperative, and not very religious societies (such as those in Western and Northern Europe), that nonetheless, retain a great degree of intragroup trust and cooperation’’ (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, p. 62; cf. Zuckerman 2008).

As Prof. Duncan summed it up to me:  "So the prosocial effects of religion, to the extent they exist, are rather thin inasmuch as they are largely motivated by reputational concerns rather than intrinsic moral concern."


April 28, 2014 in Jurisprudence | Permalink