May 22, 2008

Phyllis Schlafly Has a Friend in Rick Hills!

In any case, Professor Hills of NYU has seen the need to not only come to her defense against those who objected to her being honored by Washington University in St. Louis, but to do so without apparently knowing very much about her and also seizing the opportunity to voice his own silly prejudices about his colleagues in the academic profession.  Here's how this sorry display begins, under the disingenuous heading "The Paradox of Academic Intolerance"

Brian Leiter's anger at Phyllis Schlafly's getting an honorary degree  from Washington University, her alma mater, perplexes me.  At first glance, I am inclined to believe that Leiter's position is a product of academic intolerance for viewpoints not prevalent in the academy but widespread in the population at large.  There is a certain delicious irony about such intolerance, given the academic conceit that profs stand above parochial prejudice.

Of course, my several postings on the subject (and the links contained therein) nowhere made any mention of the prevalence (or lack thereof) of Ms. Schlafly's opinions in "the population at large," but rather referred to her bigotry against immigrants and gays, ridicule of science, ridicule of "marital rape," opposition to the rights and professional aspirations of many women, and so on.  I am not sure whether her views are "widespread"--I do not believe they are any longer--but their popularity should play no role in anyone's objections to Ms. Schlafly, and they certainly did not in mine.

But quite apart from this pointless display of solidarity with the putative masses by Professor Hills against those scary academic elites, it is astonishing to see him mischaracterize the issue as one of "tolerance."  Indeed, the first commenter on his post, Professor Matt Bodie, called him on this quite effectively:

There's a burden of proof issue here, I think. There should be a presumption towards free speech and tolerance if the university wants to prevent an individual from speaking at an event (for example, if invited by a student group). In such cases, tolerance would counsel letting the person speak, and arguments about the person's politics may not be enough. If the university wants to give an honorary degree, however, it seems completely justifiable to argue that the university should not honor the person based on the merits. Using words such as "disqualifies," "intolerance," and "beyond the academic pale" misses the point. If you disagree with the critics, don't you have the burden of saying why Wash U was right to honor her?

I posted in the comments a version of the same question, though less elegantly than Professor Brodie.  Tolerance is called for precisely when one deems someone's views or practices to be dishonorable and objectionable, but nonetheless thinks they have a moral right to hold those view and engage in those practices.  The question about whether to honor someone for those views is, quite obviously, independent of the question whether they ought to be tolerated, the latter question not even being on the table until Professor Hills muddied the waters.

In any case, Professor Hills answered neither me nor Professor Bodie on this point, adopting, instead, the debater's trick of confusing the issues by accusing his sparring partner of confusion!

Matt, I think confuses two issues: (1) Whether x ought, on the merits, receive an honorary degree and (2) Whether faculty and students ought to protest, demonstrate, write letters, etc, to stop x from getting an academic degree. 

Actually there was nothing in Professor Bodie's post that confused those issues, rather he objected to Professor Hills confusing the issue of objecting to honoring Schlafly with a question of tolerance.  By his silence, we may, perhaps, infer a tacit admission by Professor Hills of the soundness of Professor Bodie's actual point.

Back now to Hills's original post:

The difficulty in resolving the question [of why I and other objected to her receiving an honorary degree] is that Leiter's invective against Schlafly is too general to be helpful on this score:  He calls her a "bigot," "parochial," "ignoramus," etc -- but those are epithets, not arguments.  They are, of course, applicable to all of us, in some measure.  (For instance, I am (a) an ignoramus about theoretical physics, (b) a bigot in my inveterate hostility towards any musical by French composer Claude-Michel Schönberg, and (c) parochial compared to many of my colleagues who are polylingual (alas, I speak only English fluently) and are always walzing off to some conference or teaching junket at Bellagio or Dubai or Singapore).

"Bigot" and "parochial" are actually words with fairly clear descriptive and referential content; one can even look them up in the dictionary--"ignoramus," too, though that's a bit closer to an epithet, though in context quite obviously referred to her ignorance about the theory of evolution by natural selection, the foundation of modern biological science, which she regularly claims is not well-supported by evidence and is just a "liberal" dogma.  In any case, my various posts gave links supporting the various charges, though Professor Hills, besides telling us he was unpersuaded by the letter of the Wash U law faculty, apparently could not be bothered to investigate the matter before pronouncing those on the other side "intolerant."

It is hard to know whether Professor Hills is being serious with his (mistaken) observation that we are all "in some measure" bigots, parochial, and ignoramuses.  I will confine myself here to the question whether Professor Hills is, indeed, an ignoramus or a bigot, such that he would not be worthy of a university honor ("parochial" is the least of the charges against Ms. Schlafly).  I accept at face value Professor Hills's admission that he is "an ignoramus about theoretical physics," but I will go out on a limb and suppose that he does not advocate for the elimination of physics from the curriculum, does not claim that physics is unsupported by evidence, and does not believe equal time should be given in physics classes to religious cosmologies.  Ms. Schlafly, and the organization she founded, the Eagle Forum, share with Professor Hills a certain ignorance--in their case, about biology (though I wouldn't turn to them for guidance on physics either, but maybe I'm wrong!)--but differ in advocating and lobbying for their ignorance to shape school curricula.  I would have thought it obvious that there was a difference between culpbable and non-culpable ignorance, or between malicious and harmless ignorance, but apparently it was not obvious to Professor Hills.

Is it "bigotry" to be consistently hostile to the music of Schonberg, or any other composer?    It certainly evinces obstinate commitment to one's opinion (though in questions of taste, it is less clear what room there is for criticism of such commitment as obstinate or unreasonable), but ordinarily (and, again, obviously in this context), the word connotes "one who regards or treats the members of a group (as a racial or ethnic group) with hatred and intolerance," which I am sure does not fairly describe Professor Hills and his attitudes.  But it equally clearly describes Ms. Schlafly's career, dating from her long association with the John Birch Society and opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and reflected in numerous positions she has taken since, some of which are described in this illuminating essay about her career by Alan Wolfe (Boston College), and which are helpfully summarized in the various letters by concerned Washington University faculty collected on the site to which I had linked early on, but which it appears Professor Hills could not be troubled to peruse before weighing in on the issue.  As the Association of Women Faculty at Washington University in St. Louis note in their letter to Chancellor Wrighton, "Ms. Schlafly's core convictions" include "that women are intellectually inferior, that American Indians are heathens, that homosexuals are ill, [and] that biological evolution is untrue," which is a fine litany of bigotry and ignorance.  Even more informative is the letter to Chancellor Wrighton from female faculty at the Medical School:

While we find Ms. Schlafly's hyper-conservative view of women's roles offensive and an antithesis to the supposedly enlightened culture of an institution of higher learning, we could support honoring someone who advocated respect for choosing traditional roles or someone who provided leadership in the Republican party.  However, Ms. Schlafly's call to arms against the real existence of marital rape or her challenge to funding of shelters by linking domestic violence to a feminist plot against men, or her encourage of parents to resist the government encroachment into the family by not immunizing their children, or her position that American Indians are hurting our children by talking about their culture, or even her approach to rallying against illegal immigration by writing articles filled with stories of illegal immigrants who have killed, or raped or otherwise committed crimes--all these things are not just opinions, they are rallying cries to fear each other, to believe that others who are different are plotting against us or are less worthy than are we.

Bigotry is one of several words that seems descriptively apt in this context, in a way that it does not for severe distaste for Schonberg.

In comments to the original post, Professor Hills responded to my pointing our Ms. Schlafly's record on the theory of evolution by natural selection as follows: 

So Schlafly has goofy theories about creationism: So what? George Bernard Shaw was a Bergsonian; The late Vine DeLoria, advocate for native American rights, loathed the theory of evolution, as he thought that it disparaged Indian creation myths; retired Berkeley law prof Phillip Johnson pressed the notion of intelligent design. Should we vote them all off the honorary degree island for these offenses?

Again, it is hard to know whether Professor Hills is really being serious, or just relishing the role of being a contrarian, even at some cost to his own reputation.   The theory of evolution by natural selection is as well-confirmed a theory as any in modern science, and creationism is not; to claim otherwise, as Ms. Schlafly has done for years, and to advocate teaching creationism (or its new surrogates, like Intelligent Design) is to align oneself with ignorance.  That seems to me quite sufficient for thinking someone does not deserve an honorary degree from a serious research university (let alone one whose reputation depends on excellence in biology!).  (The same, of course, goes for Professor Johnson on this point.)  I have never heard of Vine DeLoria, but the question is not whether he held an ignorant view, but whether he championed for his ignorance to have a place in the school curricula, as do Ms. Schlafly and Professor Johnson.  Even weirder is the reference to Shaw's affection (about which I did not know) for the ideas of the French philosopher Henri Bergson.  Professor Hills perhaps has an unduly optimistic view of the capacity for philosophers to establish that certain views are false, but whatever one's opinion of Bergson, there is no sense in which accepting his philosophy is epistemically on a par with accepting creationism.

So the good news is that Professor Hills, despite his brave admissions of ignorance and "bigotry," is still eligible for an honorary degree!  The bad news is that Schlafly should not be.  It's not a hard case.  All Professor Hills needs to do is a little more reading.

Posted by Brian Leiter on May 22, 2008 in Law Professors Saying Dumb Things, Of Academic Interest | Permalink | TrackBack

April 16, 2008

Whenever there is an opportunity to attack the First Amendment and academic freedom, Paul Campos is there!

Naturally, Professor Campos (of the University of Colorado) weighs in on the John Yoo controversy, taking a straw man version of my views as his target and calling, per his habit, for Professor Yoo to be punished.  I posted the following in the comments, and will just repost it here, since there isn't a lot more to say:

Professor Campos has the dubious distinction of being a professor of constitutional law who called for Ward Churchill to be fired for his views, and long before there was any documentation of research misconduct. He has called for Glenn Reynolds of the University of Tennessee to be punished for his ideas as well. I have written in the past about Campos's disgraceful pattern of contempt for the First Amendment and academic freedom.

Anyone interested in my actual views on the Yoo case might consult what I wrote about it here.

I also recommend the posting by attorney Scott Horton and our exchange of views in the comments section here

I suppose someone as eager as Campos to see others lose their jobs for their foolish and offensive views, or their obvious incompetence, might call for the University of Colorado to initiate an investigation of Paul Campos.  I won't be doing so.  I hope he has a long and productive career as a law professor and legal scholar, and that he can get past his embarrassing predilection to demand that everyone with views he despises (and which he believes are "crimes" etc.) should be fired. 

UPDATE:  One additional comment about the underlying issue, concerning Professor Yoo and an argument that is being bandied about.  There is lots of speculation that maybe what Yoo did (writing the torture memos) constitutes a crime or legal malpractice.  Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't:  it is unclear based on the available facts (though, on both counts, the available facts strongly suggest a negative answer, especially as to malpractice).  It is not for the University of California at Berkeley to investigate crimes or investigate legal malpractice of its faculty, based on speculations that are, quite clearly in most cases, driven by those who find Yoo's views morally odious.  Universities have no competence to carry out such investigations (does anyone think that Donald Rumsfeld or Dick Cheney will come testify before a faculty committee looking into the matter? ), and the mere prospect of such investigations would chill academic work on controversial matters almost totally. 

If an institution actually charged with investigating crimes or legal malpractice--e.g., a prosecutor, a court, a congressional committee, a bar disciplinary committee--were to conduct a proper investigation and issue a finding of misconduct that would surely then be grounds for the university to open a disciplinary proceeding.  But as things stand, there are no such grounds.  With the exception of Mr. Horton and a few others, most of those chattering about "possible" crimes and malpractice soon make it clear that what they really want is for John Yoo to be punished for his ideas and for the fact that some government officials may have acted on those ideas.  That's a standard that vioalates the First Amendment rights of state university faculty and betrays the moral ideal of academic freedom.

ONE MORE:  Paul Campos is obviously upset that every member of the legal academy knows him as the poster boy for contempt for the First Amendment rights of state university professors, and so he does what any reputable academic would do under the circumstances:  lies through his teeth.  He shows up in the comments at one of the links above to make the following declaration:

What an interesting world we live in, where the position of our philosophers is that it's perfectly OK to fire John Yoo for buying four ounces of marijuana, but an outrage against all that decent to fire him for committing war crimes (Brian Leiter, as far as I can tell, doesn't even bother to dispute that Yoo probably is guilty of war crimes. Yet he thinks it would be outrageous for Berkeley to even raise the issue of whether having a war criminal on its law school faculty was appropriate).

Campos has simply made up out of whole cloth the claim that I think Professor Yoo could be fired "for buying four ounces of mairjuana."  Amazing.  I have also expressed, here and above, the view that it is, at best, unclear whether Yoo has committed a war crime, but that I suspect the answer is that he has not.  In any case, the University of California at Berkeley is not a court of law, and until some state agency whose responsibility it is to investigate crimes does so and issues a finding, there is nothing for Berkeley to do, even if Paul Campos has steam coming out of his ears.

UPDATE:  More on John Yoo and academic freedom, in an effort to clarify some issues being suitably confused by Professor Campos and others.

Posted by Brian Leiter on April 16, 2008 in Law Professors Saying Dumb Things | Permalink | TrackBack

October 19, 2007

David Bernstein on Massad, Finkelstein, Marx, and Freud

I promise not to make a habit of this, but I could not help noticing that after I pointed out the obvious a couple of weeks ago--that Professor David Bernstein (George Mason) has a blind spot for recent attacks on academic freedom by forces outside the universities because so many of the victims, like Norman Finkelstein and Joseph Massad, are critics of Israeli policy towards the Palistinians--Professor Bernstein took it upon himself to launch new smear attacks on both of them.  Neither attack is worthy of someone who is a scholar.

In the case of his latest attack on Professor Massad of Columbia University, Professor Bernstein claims that, like the Iranian President, Massad denies that there are homosexuals.  Here is the pertinent portion of Professor Bernstein's critique:

No Homosexuals in the Arab World: Recall that at Ahmadinejad's recent speech at Columbia, he responded to a question about Iran's oppression of homosexuals by claiming that "in Iran we don't have homosexuals like in your country." His statement was met with a chorus of boos and catcalls, the only thing he said that really riled up the politically correct crowd of Morningside Heights.

Well, it may come as a surprise to Columbia faculty and students to learn that a current professor at Columbia has argued that there are no homosexuals in the entire Arab world, except for a few who have been brainwashed into believing they have a homosexual identity by an aggressive Western homosexual missionizing movement he calls "Gay International." The article is called, "Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World," and it appears in Volume 14, issue 2 of the journal Public Culture, and was elaborated upon in a book, Desiring Arabs, published by University of Chicago Press (UPDATE: BTW, I read the article, which is accessible through my GMU library account, but not the book). According to the author, "It is the very discourse of the Gay International which produces homosexuals, as well as gays and lesbians, where they do not exist" (emphasis added).

The author doesn't deny that same-sex sexual contact exists in Arab countries, but claims that the category of "homosexual" is purely a Western one exported to the Arab world by Western cultural imperialists. He suggests that by encouraging Arabs to adopt a Western homosexual identity, westernized Arab homosexuals have naturally provoked a counter-reaction against the importation of decadent Western culture into their societies. The article, to say, the least, is not at all sympathetic with the Western gay rights movements, and the author could easily write, replacing "Iran" with "the Arab world," "in the Arab world we don't have homosexuals like in your country."

My suspicion, upon reading this, was that Massad's thesis was inspired by Foucault's thesis in The History of Sexuality that homosexuality does not mark out a "kind" of human being, and thus had nothing at all to do with the bizarre delusions of the Iranian President.  Since the article in question is accessible from my university computer, this was easy enough to confirm.  Foucault's History of Sexuality is cited in notes 45 and 73 in Massad's article, and the accompanying text makes clear that Massad is endorsing Foucault's thesis.  (Indeed, the longest section of the article has its own subtitle, "Incitement to Discourse," a phrase taken directly from Foucault, as Massad acknowledges.) 

Foucault's (and Massad's) thesis does not deny that there exists same-sex contact by numerous individuals in the Arab world (as Bernstein manages to note, though seems not to understand its import); rather, it denies that engaging in same-sex contact marks out a kind of person about whom there are meaningful, lawful (or law-like) generalizations to be made (e.g., that homosexuals are mentally ill; or that homosexual men had bad relations with their father; or that homosexuals only have sex with people of the same sex, and so on).  The "kind" of person we call the "homosexual," and with whom certain traits are said to be correlated, is really a social and cultural construct, not a set of interlinked facts about sexual identity that hold invariant across societies and cultures.  Indeed, the effect of treating those who engage in same-sex contact as part of a sexual kind is, Massad claims, to "repress[] same-sex desires and practices that refuse to be assimilated into [this] sexual epistemology" (p. 362; cf. pp. 382-383 for the same point).  (I am not much enamored of Massad's writing or intellectual style, but "sexual epistemology" is his name, roughly, for what I am calling Foucault's attack on the idea that homosexuality is a "kind.")

Foucault is, of course, skeptical quite generally about psychiatric kinds (and he is not alone on that score:  see, e.g., this informative review of a recent book on this general topic).  I have my own doubts about Foucault's general thesis (for reasons discussed in particular on pp. 1091-1094 of this article, forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy that I edited with Michael Rosen), and Professor Massad's deployment of the idea might be thought premised on the assumption that such doubts are misplaced.  But all of that is neither here nor there.  By associating Professor Massad's familiar (and much-debated) thesis about the nature of sexual orientation with the Iranian President's mad skepticism about whether there are any people engaged in same-sex sexual contact, Professor Bernstein's intent was obviously to smear Massad via "guilt by association"--even though Massad's thesis has nothing at all to do with Ahmadinejad's.

In the case of Professor Finkelstein, Professor Bernstein suggests that opposition to the former DePaul professor arises not simply because he is a critic of Israeli policy but because he makes anti-semitic remarks.  (Professor Bernstein also appears to endorse the views of someone named Cathy Young, who doesn't realize that Finkelstein's book published by the University of California Press was, in fact, a peer-refereed publication, but let's just put that display of ignorance to one side.  [On the merits of Finkelstein's scholarship and tenure case, the remarks of John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, are far more informative; he calls the work "first rate" and makes absolutely clear how outrageous and politically corrupt the DePaul tenure decision was.]) 

Professor Bernstein rests his entire case on two quotations which he deems to be anti-semitic.  The first one seems gratuitously offensive but not anti-semitic (one might criticize appallingly unethical bullies like Abraham Foxman without inflammatory comparisons to Nazi stereotypes), while the second is neither offensive nor anti-semitic (it may, in fact, be false, but Finkelstein provides the evidence that warrants it).  Maybe I just have an old-fashioned view of anti-semitism, but I regard remarks as anti-semitic if they denigrate Jews qua Jews, ascribing negative or ugly characteristics or behaviors to someone based on their being a Jew, and nothing else.  Neither of the passages Bernstein's quote do that; indeed, the first does the opposite.  Adducing evidence that a particular Jewish person, or a particular Jewish community, engages in certain behaviors is not evidence of anti-semitism (unless, perhaps, all the evidence turned out to be false, in which case one might infer anti-semitic motives:  but that is plainly not applicable to Finkelstein's claims). 

To make matters worse, it turns out that Professor Bernstein has lifted both quotes out of context.  Fortunately, he is called on that misrepresentation by a commenter.  (Another commenter also makes some interesting observations here.)

I suppose if there were any remaining doubt that with respect to certain topics, David Bernstein is moved primarily by ideology--not concern for academic freedom or scholarly rigor--one need only look at his most recent post comparing professors influenced by Marxism to those who subscribe to Intelligent Design--which is then supplemented in the comments section by his wholly false claim that Freud's "work (or at least the vast majority of it) can't stand up to the scientific method, either." 

One need not know much to know that Intelligent Design is just creationism repackaged by those who have consulted a lawyer and a public relations expert, and one may safely assume that Professor Bernstein intends the comparison to be unflattering.  One would, however, have to know a fait bit to know about the actual nature and status of Marxist scholarship or the actual scientific status of Freud's theory.  If one doesn't know anything about the subject, as Professor Bernstein obviously does not, one might choose instead to remain silent.  Not Professor Bernstein.

With regard to Marxism (I have blogged about this before), I think there is a fairly robust consensus that all of the following aspects of Marx's theory are false:  (1) the labor theory of value; (2) the theory of the falling rate of profit; (3) the teleological conception of history; and (4) the a priori commitment to the dialectical structure of historical change.  Many writers are also skeptical about Marx's conception of human flourishing, though like most philosophical accounts of the good life it still has sympathizers (though this hardly distinguishes it from most other views in the philosophical canon on this score). 

My suspicion is that the vast majority of professors influenced by Marxism are not influenced by any of the preceding doctrines.  Instead, they find fruitful two other Marxian ideas:  (1) that one can explain historical events by attention to how different economic classes pursue their material interests, which lead them into conflict with other economic classes, and (2) that one can explain the public dominance of the moral and political ideas in a culture by reference to the role they play in promoting the interests of economic elites, and even though these ideas will involve systematic mistakes about interests on the part of non-elites.  Both (1) and (2) involve empirical claims that have been amply supported in numerous historical and sociological studies.  (That they have been "amply supported" is not to say that they are well-confirmed, and thus clearly true:--but they are better-supported than most theses that play a fruitful theoretical role in historical explanations.)  The scholarly literatures here are voluminous, so it's hard to know where to begin, but interested readers might look at this paper of mine, especially note 41.

Professor Bernstein is equally ignorant about the actual state of the empirical literature on Freud:  he is apparently unaware of the experimental evidence that supports various Freudian theses (in the same paper, see, e.g., note 89 and the accompanying text).   In any case, this is no longer worth belaboring.  Professor Bernstein is obviously not a credible critic (as even the comments on his posts at the right-wing Volokh site tend to make clear).  Yet he is symptomatic of a culture in which politically motivated attacks on the universities are growing more and more common.  As Professor Mearsheimer remarked in his talk about the Finkelstein tenure case (linked above), universities are the only place in America where Israel can be discussed honestly and frankly, as though it is just "another country," whose virtues and foibles, and their relationship to strategic American interests (Mearsheimer's main concern), can be evaluated.  It is also an arena in which empirical work--historical, sociological, and psychological--can be done that might lend support to theories (like Marx's or Freud's) deemed "beyond the pale" by the know-nothing public culture.  There is no reason for Professor Bernstein to be interested in this work, and no one would fault him for remaining silent about it.  But one might hope that, as a scholar, he would not contribute to mindless anti-intellectualism about other scholarly pursuits, or participate in smearing authors of scholarly work about Mideast politics that he finds unpalatable.

UPDATE:  It would be impossible to do justice in a summary to the multi-layered irrationality of Professor Bernstein's "reply", but I do commend it to those readers with a standing interest in the Dunning-Kruger Effect.   Some of the commenters (start here and scroll down, also here) point out some of the, shall we say, peculiarities in Professor Bernstein's remarks.  I shall comment additionally on only one:  I do not really understand why Professor Bernstein brought up my skepticism about evolutionary psychology, but it does not appear he has any idea about its grounds, since he adds (in his typical free-association style) that it "horrifies the far left because it suggests the lack of malleability of human nature."  The argument of our paper, however, turned on the criteria for confirming selectionist explanations, the metaphysics of inference to the best explanation, and problems about the "level" of explanation needed to predict and control phenomena.  It had nothing to do with the "malleability of human nature" (though it is probably true that some on the right are attracted to evolutionary psychology precisely because they think it confirms a picture of human nature they find morally attractive).   Since Professor Bernstein has just gotten through complaining about what he deems my excessive sympathy for certain Marxian and Freudian theses, it might have occurred to him that both Marx and Freud had conceptions of human nature, and that Freud's rather robust one--most evident in Civilization and Its Discontents--involves a fierce denial of the "malleability of human nature."  So the relevance of Bernstein's invocation of "the far left"'s dogmatic commitment to "the malleability of human nature" in the context of responding to me is what exactly?

ANOTHER:  David McGowan (San Diego) sent me a link to his review of Professor Bernstein's free speech book.  Pages 4-10 of the review suggest that Professor Bernstein's difficulty with references and context is not limited to his blog postings.

Posted by Brian Leiter on October 19, 2007 in Law Professors Saying Dumb Things, Of Academic Interest | Permalink | TrackBack

June 01, 2007

Catty Remark of the Month

In the midst of last week's discussion by Randy Barnett (Georgetown) and Einer Elhauge (Harvard) of why there are so many visiting professors, an anonymous law professor posted the following hands-down winner for cattiest comment of the month.  Remarking on another commenter who said,

And [Harvard professors will] tell you that only with the uptick in lateral hires (starting slowly under Clark, and increasing dramatically under Kagan) has HLS returned to a position of being able safely to say that its faculty comprises superstars of academia across the board.

Our anonymous professor writes:

Well, they can say that safely, but they can't say that accurately. Person for person, the Harvard faculty is still pretty weak. It's not as bad as it was 5-10 years ago, when it was sort of an open joke. But it's only maybe in the top 5 on a person-for-person basis. Better quality faculties would include Yale, NYU, Chicago, & Stanford. Plus, a bunch of Harvard's recent hires have been mediocre.

That's part of the irony with Elhauge's blogging about the new Harvard entry-level standards: Harvard has hired a bunch of people that are not very good, and that are very likely to prove themselves duds. So sure, Harvard will hire like that for a while. It will be the new big thing, and the Harvard faculty will feel very good about it. But eventually they'll see it's not working for them, and in another 10 years they'll pick a different approach.

I guess I'd nominate a particular NYU professor as the likely author of this rather nasty comment, especially since NYU is so obviously the "odd man out" in a list of faculties notable for their person-for-person or per capita strength.   Nothing like anonymity to bring out the charm!

ADDENDUM:  One of my esteemed NYU colleagues protests that the evidence adduced does not warrant the inference about the culprit, so I hereby withdraw it.  I should note that I had in mind one other, non-publishable, piece of evidence for thinking a particular NYU professor had posted it, but that too probably underdetermines the conclusion drawn.  So let us leave the catty remark standing on its own, with its author the sole possessor of his or her motives--and with my apologies for any unintended offense taken by colleagues at NYU.

Posted by Brian Leiter on June 1, 2007 in Faculty News, Law Professors Saying Dumb Things, Of Academic Interest | Permalink | TrackBack

September 17, 2006

Around the Law Blogs One More Time

Althouse v. Feminist Bloggers, round two.  (Thanks to Ann Bartow for the pointer, who weighs in here.)

This blogger also comments on Professor Althouse's latest tangle with feminists, though in an unecessarily sexist way.  "Jackass" would surely suffice.  (Professor Althouse's target has a different epithet in mind, which I won't reprint out of respect for those with more refined sensibilities.)

More amusing commentary on the latest tempest in a teapot involving law bloggers here.

UPDATE:  This fellow has the funniest (and best-written) set of observations on this tempest!

Posted by Brian Leiter on September 17, 2006 in Law Professors Saying Dumb Things | Permalink | TrackBack

May 08, 2006

Eugene Volokh Fan Club Loses Another Member

Here.  Admittedly, the club rosters may have been thinning since last year's odd defense of the idea that gays "convert" nice straight folks, or his rush of enthusiasm for torture.  Also see the apt comments by Ann Bartow (South Carolina). 

Very odd.

Posted by Brian Leiter on May 8, 2006 in Law Professors Saying Dumb Things | Permalink | TrackBack