December 29, 2016

Some publications and working papers this year

I appreciate the many blog readers who also read my scholarly writing--it has been one of the best things about the blog for years that it has been a vehicle for sharing my work with other faculty and students across many fields.   In that spirit, here are publications--or working drafts--that I made available this year:

"The Case Against Free Speech" appeared in Sydney Law Review.

 

"Legal Positivism about the Artifact Law," forthcoming in an OUP volume on Law as Artifact.

 

"Theoretical Disagreements in Law: Another Look," forthcoming in an OUP volume on Ethical Norms, Legal Norms:  New Essays in Metaethics and Jurisprudence.

 

"Philosophy of Law," co-authored with Michael Sevel, in the Encyclopedia Britannica (if you can't access the whole essay, google "philosophy of law," it should come up as a top result and you can get the whole essay that way)

 

"The Paradoxes of Public Philosophy," in the inaugural issue of the Indian Journal of Legal Theory.

 

"Why Tolerate Religion, Again? A Reply to Michael McConnell," a working paper (but citable) at SSRN. 

 

"Reply to Five Critics of Why Tolerate Religion?", part of a symposium on my book published by Criminal Law and Philosophy this year.

 

A revised version of "The Death of God and the Death of Morality," which will eventually appear in a special issue of The Monist on Nietzsche.

 

"Moralizing Nietzsche's Moral Psycology: The Case of Katsafanas," a review essay which also appears at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

 

"Moralities are a Sign-Language of the Affects," appeared in 2013 in Social Philosophy and Policy, but I was now able to make the published PDF available on SSRN.

 

There were actually a couple of other papers I wrote this year that I could not put on SSRN, alas--though hopefully, like the last paper, I will be able to post them in the future after publication.  And then there were papers previously put on SSRN that finally appeared in books this year (e.g., here and here), but for which I have not been able to put a PDF on-line.

Thanks for reading!  And a Happy New Year to all readers!


December 29, 2016 in Jurisprudence, Navel-Gazing | Permalink

December 20, 2016

"The Case Against Free Speech"

This long-gestating paper has finally appeared in the Sydney Law Review (it was originally presented as the 2013 Julius Stone Address in Jurisprudence at Sydney), and can be downloaded here for those who are interested.  


December 20, 2016 in Jurisprudence | Permalink

December 08, 2016

2016 Dewey Lecture in Law & Philosophy at Chicago with Leslie Green (Oxford)

A video of this wonderful lecture and the Q&A is now available here.  The lecture itself begins about seven minutes in, after various introductions.  (The Dewey Lecture this year was the day after the election, as it happened, which may explain a few comments and jokes.)


December 8, 2016 in Jurisprudence | Permalink

November 17, 2016

"Legal Positivism about the Artifact Law"

My contribution to a forthcoming OUP volume, sparked by interest in the claim by me and others that law is an artifactual not a natural kind and the ramifications of that for a theory of law.


November 17, 2016 in Jurisprudence | Permalink

October 01, 2016

Once again, officials of the Alabama legal system show that they accept the rule of recognition of the Federal legal system...

....from an internal point of view.   Roy Moore is the jurisprudential gift that keeps on giving!  (And for those who don't follow what I'm talking about, see pp. 1603-4 of this essay.)


October 1, 2016 in Jurisprudence, Legal Profession | Permalink

August 28, 2016

"Theoretical Disagreements in Law: Another Look"

new paper forthcoming from OUP in Ethical Norms, Legal Norms:  New Essays in Meteaethics and Jurisprudence (edited by Plunkett, Shapiro & Toh); the abstract:

In "Explaining Theoretical Disagreement" (2009), I defended an answer to Dworkin's argument that legal positivists can not adequately explain disagreements among judges about what the criteria of legal validity are. I here respond to a variety of critics of my answer, in particular, Kevin Toh. I argue that Toh misrepresents Hart's own views, and misunderstands the role of "presupposition" in both Hart and Kelsen. I argue that a correct reading of Hart is compatible with the error-theoretic interpretation of theoretical disagreement I defended in 2009.


August 28, 2016 in Jurisprudence | Permalink

August 16, 2016

Philosophy of law in the Encyclopaedia Britannica

This is the first new essay commissioned on the subject in more than fifty years (the last one was by Julius Stone, also a legal realist!).  I had the privilege of co-authoring the new essay with a former student, the legal philosopher Michael Sevel (not a legal realist, but like Stone, at the University of Sydney!).  Alas, you need to access it from an institution that subscribes to read this essay in full.

UPDATE:  After I posted a similar announcement at my philosophy blog, an editor at EB wrote:  "in fact anyone can read the entire article for free if he/she comes to it through a Google search. I believe we are fourth or fifth in the hit list returned by searching on 'philosophy of law'. Clicking on the link should provide access to the full article. (Obviously, searching on "philosophy of law Britannica" would make it even easier.) Likewise any other article in Britannica."  Useful information, I didn't realize that!


August 16, 2016 in Jurisprudence | Permalink

May 09, 2016

On the new translation of Alf Ross's "Of Law and Justice" and Hart's misreading of Ross

This is going to be an important event in jurisprudence.  (I touch on some of this, which I learned from Prof. Holtermann, here.)


May 9, 2016 in Jurisprudence | Permalink

May 08, 2016

"Why Tolerate Religion, Again? A Reply to Michael McConnell"

At SSRN; the abstract:

This essay discusses a lengthy review by Professor Michael McConnell of the Stanford Law School in the Yale Law Journal of my 2013 book WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (Princeton University Press). I identify two important objections that Prof. McConnell raises, but also identify eight different mistakes or misunderstandings that mar other parts of the review. I conclude by taking Prof. McConnell to task for several rhetorical cheap shots that, together with the other errors, suggests that his essay was more a partisan brief than a scholarly evaluation of the arguments. Most surprisingly, the fact that Professor McConnell, in his lengthy review, never actually responds to my book's central thesis--namely, that the inequality between religious and non-religious claims of conscience is not morally defensible--suggests that there may really be no serious argument on the other side.


May 8, 2016 in Jurisprudence, Of Academic Interest | Permalink

April 07, 2016

President Obama is at the University of Chicago Law School today discussing the Supreme Court and the nomination of Judge Garland...

...which you can watch here.  And if you'd like to know the truth about what's really going on with Supreme Court nomination battles, read this.  (I'm not there, I'm at home working, since the faculty have been thrown out of their offices for the day!)


April 7, 2016 in Jurisprudence, Legal Profession, Of Academic Interest | Permalink